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Abstract
In this paper we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economy
with complete markets. We show that the completeness of the market requires both the
set of asset payo¤s and collateral levels to be su¢ ciently rich, so as to allow to decentral-
ize the equilibrium allocations obtained in Arrow-Debreu markets subject to a series of
appropriate limited pledgeability constraints. We provide then su¢ cient conditions for
equilibria to be Pareto e¢ cient and show that when collateral is scarce equilibria are also
often constrained ine¢ cient, in the sense that imposing tighter borrowing restrictions
can make everybody in the economy better o¤.
We derive su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Markov equilibria and show that
they often have nite support. The model is then tractable and its equilibria can be
computed with arbitrary accuracy. We carry out on this basis a quantitative assessment
of the risk sharing and e¢ ciency properties of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
We examine the competitive equilibria of an innite-horizon exchange economy where the
only limit to risk sharing comes from the presence of a collateral constraint. Financial
markets are complete but consumers face a borrowing limit, determined by the fact that
the only enforcement mechanism in the economy is the possible seizure of the collateral
associated with a loan position. Only part of the consumers future endowment can be
pledged as collateral, hence the borrowing constraint may be binding and limit the risk
sharing possibilities in the economy. The loss of the collateral is the only loss an agent faces
for his default, there is no additional punishment, for instance in the form of exclusion from
trade in nancial markets as in the model considered by Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez
and Jermann (2000). Also, in contrast to Bewley (1977) and the literature which followed
it1, the level of the borrowing constraint is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The analysis is carried out in the set-up of a Lucas (1978) style economy with a single
perishable consumption good. The part of a consumers endowment that can be pledged
as collateral can be naturally interpreted as the agents initial share of the Lucas tree a
long-lived asset in positive supply that pays dividends at each date-event. This asset can
be used, both directly and indirectly, as collateral for any short position of the consumer.
We show in this paper that this is a tractable model of dynamic economies under un-
certanty, establish the existence of Markov and of nite support equilibria, analyze the
welfare properties of competitive equilibria and the risk sharing pattern that is attained.
More specically, we show the equivalence between the competitive equilibria when trade
occurs in a complete set of contingent commodity markets at the initial date, as in Arrow
Debreu, subject to a series of appropriate limited pleadgeability constraints, and the equi-
libria when trade is sequential, in nancial markets, and short positions must be backed
by suitably dened collateral constraints. This allows to clearly identify market structures,
and in particular the specication of asset payo¤s and of the associated collateral require-
ments, such that the only nancial friction is the collateral constraint. Second, we derive
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a Markov equilibrium in this model when there is a
nite number of agentstypes and show that Markov equilibria often have nite supportin
the sense that individualsconsumption only takes nitely many values. Third, we provide
some su¢ cient conditions for competitive equilibria to be fully Pareto e¢ cient, that is for
the amount of available collateral to be su¢ ciently large that the collateral constraint never
binds. In addition, we show that, whenever the constraint binds, competitive equilibria
in this model are not only Pareto ine¢ cient but are also often constrained suboptimal, in
the sense that introducing tighter restrictions on borrowing from some date t > 0 (with
respect to the restrictions imposed by the collateral constraints) makes all agents better
o¤. Finally, we carry out a quantitative assessment of the e¢ ciency properties and the risk
sharing pattern of competitive equilibria for realisticspecications of the economy and of
1See Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009) for a survey.
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the existing amount of collateral.
Several papers have formalized the idea that borrowing on collateral might give rise to
cyclical uctuations in the real activity and enhance volatility of prices (see e.g. Geanakoplos
(1997) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). They typically assume in addition that nancial
markets are incomplete, or other frictions are present, so that it is not clear if the source
of the ine¢ ciency are the missing markets or the limited ability of the agents to use the
existing collateral for their borrowing needs. Furthermore, dynamic models with collateral
constraints and incomplete markets turn out to be very di¢ cult to analyze (see Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) for a discussion), no conditions are known that ensure existence of
recursive equilibria and there are therefore few quantitative results about the welfare losses
due to collateral.
We show here that considering an environment where nancial markets are complete and
there are no restrictions to how the existing collateral can be used to back short positions,
while not immediate to formalize, allows to simplify matters considerably. In our model
equilibria can often be characterized as the solution of a nite system of equation. We
show that a numerical approximation of equilibria is fairly simple and a rigorous error
analysis is possible. Moreover we can use the implicit function theorem to conduct local
comparative statics and perform a serious quantitative analysis of the potential welfare
gains from government intervention.
As mentioned above, there is also a large literature that assumes that agents can trade in
complete nancial markets, default is punished with the permanent exclusion from future
trades and loans are not collateralized. As shown in Kehoe and Levine (1993), (2001),
Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these limited enforcement modelsare extremely tractable
since competitive equilibria can be written as the solution to a planning problem subject
to appropriate constraints. Even though this is not true in the environment considered
here - we show that competitive equilibria may be constrained ine¢ cient - tractability still
obtains.
Chien and Lustig (2011) (also Lustig (2000) in an earlier, similar work) examine a ver-
sion of the model in this paper with a continuum of agents and growth. The main focus
of their analysis is on a quantitative assessment of the asset pricing implications of the
model and their similarities with Alvarez and Jermann (2000). However, they also present
some theoretical results that are similar to ours. Under the assumption of identical CRRA
utility they give a su¢ cient condition for competitive equilibria to be Pareto e¢ cient. Here
we present a necessary and su¢ cient condition, for the case of i.i.d. shocks, no aggregate
uncertainty and nitely many consumerstypes. Most importantly, their notion of recur-
sive equilibrium also uses individualsmultipliers (Chien and Lustig call them "stochastic
Pareto-Negishi weights") as an endogenous state variable and is essentially identical to ours.
However, the results on the existence of such recursive equilibria and of nite support equi-
libria are rather di¤erent, as explained more in detail in the next sections. Also, they
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do not examine how the allocation can be decentralized in asset markets with collateral
constraints nor they discuss the constrained ine¢ ciency of competitive equilibria.
Lorenzoni (2008) as well as Kilenthong and Townsend (2011) obtain an analogous con-
strained ine¢ ciency result to ours but in a production economy. As they point out, given
the previous literature on suboptimality the result is not entirely surprising.2 Their analy-
sis is di¤erent as in that environment capital accumulation link di¤erent periods and the
reallocation is induced by a change in the level of investment that modies available re-
sources. In our pure exchange set-up resources are xed, only their distribution can vary
and the reallocation is indiced by tightening the borrowing constraints with respect to their
level endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Geanakoplos and Zame (2002, and, in a later version, 2009) are the rst to formally
introduce collateral constraints into general equilibrium models. They consider a two period
model with incomplete markets where a durable good needs to be used as collateral. They
are the rst to point out that, even if markets are complete and the amount of collateral in
the economy is large, the Pareto e¢ cient Arrow Debreu outcome cannot be obtained unless
one allows for collateralized nancial securities to be used as collateral in addition to the
durable good (they refer to this as pyramiding). Our equivalence result in Section 3 below
makes crucial use of this insight.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the eco-
nomic model. Section 3 shows the equivalence of equilibrium allocations in three di¤erent
market environments, with complete contingent markets at the initial date and with se-
quential trade in nancial markets. In Section 4 we present a simple example to illustrate
the properties of competitive equilibria. In Section 5 we study the existence of Markov
equilibria and show that they are sometimes described by a nite system of equations. In
Section 6 we analyze the welfare properties of equilibria and in Section 7 we carry out a
quantitative assessment of the equilibrium properties.
2 Arrow Debreu Economies with Limited Pledgeability
We examine an innite horizon stochastic model of an exchange economy with a single
perishable consumption good available at each date. We represent the resolution of uncer-
tainty by an event tree at each period t = 0; 1; : : : one of S possible exogenous shocks
s 2 S = f1; : : : ; Sg occurs and each node of the tree is characterized by a history of shocks
 = st = (s0    st). The exogenous shocks follow a Markov process with transition matrix
, where (s; s0) denotes the probability of shock s0 given s. We assume that (s; s0) > 0 for
all s; s0 2 S. With a slight abuse of notation we also write (st) to denote the unconditional
probability of node st. We collect all nodes of the innite tree in a set  and we write
0   if node 0 is either the same as node  or a (not necessarily immediate) successor.
2The main contribution of Kilenthong and Townsend is to show how constrained optimality can be
restored using market-based, segregated exchanges in securities.
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We write 0   if 0 is a successor of (i.e. not the same as) .
There are H innitely lived agents which we collect in a set H. Each agent hs individual
endowment of the consumption good depends on the current shock alone, i.e. !h(st) =
!h(st) where !h : S ! R++ is a time-invariant function of the shock.
We consider the allocations obtained as competitive equilibria when agents can trade in a
complete set of contingent markets, but face some borrowing constraints. These constraints
are endogenously set at a level determined by the consumersinability to borrow against
part of their future income, given by non tangible, or non pledgeable resources. We present
in what follows some alternative market structures to model such environment, the rst
one in the rest of this section with complete contingent commodity markets as in Arrow
Debreu. In the next section we present two other structures with sequential trades in asset
markets and show that competitive equilibrium allocations are the same in each of the
market structures considered.
We assume that an agents endowment consists of two parts. The rst part is non
pledgeable in the sense that an agent cannot sell in advance this part of the endowment
in order to nance consumption or savings at any date before the endowment is received.
We denote these non pleadgeable endowments by eh(st)  0 for all st. The second part of
the endowments is given by tangible resources and can be sold to nance consumption and
savings earlier in time and is denoted by fh(st)  0. We thus have
!h() = eh() + fh() for all :
We assume that both components are also time invariant and only depend on the current
shock: eh(st) = eh(st), fh(st) = fh(st). Aggregate endowments are denoted !() =P
h2H !
h().
Agent h 2 H maximizes a time-separable expected utility function
Uh(c) = E
( 1X
t=0
tuh(ct; st)
)
;
where expectations are taken with respect to the Markov transition matrix , and the
discount factor  2 (0; 1). We assume that the possibly state dependent Bernoulli function
uh(; s) : R++ ! R is strictly monotone, C2, strictly concave, and satises the Inada-
condition u0h(x; s) ! 1 as x ! 0, for all s 2 S. In the following discussion we will
suppress the dependence of uh on s whenever there is no possibility of confusion.
As mentioned above, we consider here the case where consumers can trade at t = 0 in a
complete set of contingent commodity markets, but are subject to the constraint imposed
by the nonpleadgeability of part of the endowment. More precisely, we dene an Arrow
Debreu equilibrium with limited pledgeability as a collection of prices (())2 and
a consumption allocation (ch())h2H2 such thatX
h2H
(ch()  !h()) = 0;  2  (1)
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and for all agents h
ch 2 arg maxUh(c) s.t. (2)X
2
()ch() 
X
2
()!h() <1 (3)X
st
()ch() 
X
st
()eh() for all st: (4)
The denition is the same as that of an Arrow Debreu competitive equilibrium except
for the additional constraints (4). These constraints express precisely the condition that
eh() is unalienable, i.e. this component of the endowment can only be used to nance
consumption in the node  in which it is received or in any successor node. Assuming
strictly monotonic preferences the specication of the constraint follows. Note that these
additional constraints are likely to be binding whenever the eh-part of the endowments is
large relative to the fh -part, that is when there is only a small amount of future endowments
that can be traded at earlier nodes of the tree.
3 Financial Markets with Limited Pledgeability
We turn next our attention to environments where trade takes place sequentially in asset
markets. We present two alternative specications of the set of nancial instruments avail-
able to consumers and show that they both allow to decentralize Arrow Debreu equilibria
with limited pledgeability. In the nancial market equilibria the component of the individ-
ual endowments that can be sold in advance constitutes the dividends of some innitely
lived aggregate physical assets in positive net supply (i.e., Lucas trees which can be in-
terpreted as rms, machines, land or houses) that is tradeable in the market. Consumers
are then either prevented from borrowing against the other, non pleadgeable component of
their endowment or they can do it but subject to appropriate collateral constraints.
To simplify the notation we restrict our attention to the case where there is a single tree
and impose then the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The alienable component of the individual endowments is collinear across
agents, i.e.
fh() = h(s 1)d();
for some h(s 1) > 0 with
P
h2H 
h(s 1) = 1.
At period 0 each agent h is endowed with a share h(s 1)  0 of the tree, and we
normalize the outstanding amount to
P
h2H 
h(s 1) = 1. The tree pays strictly positive
dividends d : S ! R++ that depend solely on the current shock realization s 2 S. Without
the above assumption the equivalence with the economy described in the previous section
could still be shown but we would need to introduce several types of trees. This would only
complicate the notation without making any substantial di¤erence.
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To show the equivalence of the nancial market equilibria with the Arrow-Debreu equi-
libria with limited pledgeability described in the previous section, nancial markets have to
be complete in the sense that the only friction faced by consumers is the limited ability to
borrow against their future endowments.
3.1 Equilibrium with intermediaries
We consider rst a specication where each period intermediaries purchase the tree from
consumers and issue on that basis a complete set of one period, shock-contingent claims
(options) on the tree which are bought by consumers. This is a stylized model of nancial
markets based on the fairly strong assumptions that intermediaries operate at no costs and
face no commitment problems. However, this specication turns out to be very useful to
examine the properties, in particular the welfare properties of specications where collateral
constraints are explicitly introduced.
Intermediaries issue each period J = S assets, where asset j promises the delivery of
one unit of the tree the subsequent period if and only if shock s = j realizes. Households in
the economy can only take long positions in these assets at every node as well as in the tree
(the latter is however redundant and can so be ignored in the householdsproblem with no
loss of generality). The intermediariesholdings of the tree ensure that all due payments
can be made. At any node st an agent purchases a portfolio of tree-options (st; s)  0,
s = 1; : : : ; S, at the prices q(st; s) > 0, s = 1; :::; S. The price of the entire tree is then
q(st) and the condition q(st) =
PS
s=1 q(s
t; s) ensures that intermediaries make zero prot in
equilibrium, since the intermediation technology, with zero costs, exhibit constant returns
to scale.
A nancial markets equilibrium with intermediaries (in short, an equilibrium
with intermediaries) is dened as a collection of individual consumptions (ch())h2H2 ; port-
folios (h())h2H2 , as well as prices (q())2, such that markets clear and agents maximize
their utility, i.e.
(IE1) At all nodes st, X
h2H
h(st; s) = 1 for all s 2 S:
(IE2) For all agents h 2 H
(ch; h) 2 arg max
;c0
Uh(c) s.t.
c(st) = eh(st) + (st 1; st)
 
SX
s0=1
q(st; s0) + d(st)
!
 
SX
s0=1
(st; s0)q(st; s0)
(st; s)  0; 8st; s
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We show next that each collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibrium allocation with
prices (())2 is also an equilibrium allocation in an equilibrium with intermediaries3.
Set the prices of the tree equal to q(st) = 1(st)
P
st ()d() and the prices of the
tree-options as
q(st; st+1) =
1
(st)
(st+1)
 
q(st+1) + d(st+1)

(5)
for every st; st+1. It is then easy to see that the set of budget feasible consumption levels
are the same for the budget set in (IE2) and for the budget set dened by (3) and (4).
Given a consumption sequence (c())2 that satises (IE2), using (5) we get
(st)(st 1; st)(q(st)+d(st)) = (st)(c(st) eh(st))+(st)
X
st+12S
(st; st+1)
(st+1)
(st)
(q(st+1)+d(st+1))
for each st with t  1. Substituting then recursively for the second term on the right hand
side we obtain
(st)(st 1; st)(q(st) + d(st)) =
X
st
()(c()  eh())  0;
that is (4) holds. At the root node s0 we have
h(s )(q(s0) + d(s0)) =
X
st
()(c()  eh())
equivalent to (3). The reverse implication can be similarly shown.
3.2 Equilibrium with collateral constraints
We consider next a specication of nancial markets where, in addition to the tree, there is
a set of nancial securities which the consumers can directly short each period but facing a
limited commitment problem as they can default at no cost on their obligations. The tree
is then used as collateral for such obligations, as in the model of Geanakoplos and Zame
(2002) and its extension to an innite horizon economy by Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
Agent h can now buy any amount h()  0 of shares of the tree at any node  for a unit
price q(). In addition to this physical asset, there are J nancial assets which we collect in
a set J . These assets are one-period securities; asset j traded at node st promises a payo¤
bj(s
t+1) = bj(st+1)  0 at the S successor nodes (st+1). We denote agent hs portfolio in
nancial assets by h; and write pj() for the price of asset j.
Di¤erently from the physical asset, consumers can short any of the nancial securities.
They can default then at no cost on the prescribed payments. To ensure that some payments
are made, each short position security is backed by an appropriate collateral requirement.
3Since we wish to avoid the issue of possible existence of bubbles in the tree price, we only consider the
implementation of collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibria as nancial market equilibria and not the
reverse.
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At each node , we associate with each nancial security j 2 J a collateral requirement
described by the vector4 kj() 2 RJ+1+ . For each unit of security j sold by a consumer,
she is required to hold kjJ+1 units of the tree as well as k
j
i units of each security i 2 J as
collateral. In the next period the agent can default on her promise to deliver bj(st+1) per
unit sold and will actually nd it optimal to do so whenever bj(st+1) is lower than the value
of the collateral. In this case the buyer of the nancial security gets the collateral associated
with the promise. Hence the actual payo¤ of any security j 2 J at any node st+1 is now
given by
fj(s
t+1) = min
(
bj(st+1);
JX
i=1
kji (s
t)fi(s
t+1) + kjJ+1(s
t)(q(st+1) + d(st+1))
)
: (6)
Without further restrictions on collateral requirements, the above expression might not
be well dened or have several solutions for fj(), j 2 J ;  2 . Many possible restrictions
can be imposed to solve this problem: we assume here that there is a seniority structure
of obligations, i.e. that if a security can be used as collateral for a second security and this
can in turn be used as collateral for a third security and so on, then none of these can be
used as collateral for the rst security. Formally we say that a security j is senior to another
security j0 if it can be used, directly or indirectly, as collateral for the second one: that is,
if there exist a series of securities j1; :::; jn with j1 = j and jn = j0 and with k
ji
ji 1 > 0 for all
i = 2; : : : ; n. We assume that seniority is irreexive, i.e. if j is senior to j0 then j0 cannot be
senior to j. The assumption that not only the tree but also nancial securities can be used
as collateral allows to economize on the use of the tree as collateral and is needed, as we
will see later, to obtain the equivalence with collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibria.
Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) refer to this assumption as pyramiding.
A collateral constrained nancial markets equilibriu is dened as in Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) as a collection of choices (ch(); h(); h())2 for all agents
h 2 H, prices, (p(); q())2 and payo¤s (f())2 satisfying (6) and the following other
conditions:
(CC1) Market clearing: X
h2H
h() = 1 and
X
h2H
h() = 0 for all  2 :
4The collateral requirement could also depend on current and the expectation over future prices, but for
notational simplicity we do not make this explicit.
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(CC2) Individual optimization: for each agent h
(h(); h(); ch())2 2 arg max
0;;c0
Uh(c) s.t.
c(st) = eh(st) + (s
t 1)  f(st) + (st 1)(q(st) + d(st))  (st)q(st)  (st)  p(st); 8st
(st) +
X
j2J
kjJ+1(s
t) min[0; j(s
t)]  0; 8st
max

j(s
t); 0
	
+
X
i2J
kij(s
t) min[0; i(s
t)]  0; 8st, 8i 2 J :
Evidently in this case nancial markets can be complete or incomplete depending on
the asset structure J . Chien and Lustig (2010) (also Lustig (2000)) analyze a model with
collateral requirements where, in addition to the tree, a complete set of S Arrow securities
is available for trade at each node and the tree must be used as collateral for short positions
in these Arrow securities. A crucial di¤erence between their set-up and the one described
above is that they assume that the tree can be used to secure short positions in several
Arrow securities at the same time, i.e. the collateral constraint only has to hold ex post, for
each realization of the payo¤ of the security. This clearly allows to economize on the use
of the tree as collateral but it also requires a stronger enforcement and coordination ability
among lenders and seems then more di¢ cult to justify.
On the other hand, with the collateral constraints as in (CC2) above, it is clear that
assuming a full set of Arrow securities does not su¢ ce to show the equivalence with col-
lateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibria, that is with the situation where insurance
markets are complete and the only constraint is the limited pledgeability of consumers
future endowments.
3.2.1 Complete markets
We show next that when the set of assets J is large and includes all possible kinds of
securities, subject to all possible kinds of collateral constraints specied in the previous
section, collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibria can be decentralized as collateral
constrained nancial market equilibria. For this it su¢ ces to show that this is possible for
some collection of assets J  J .
One possible specication (although certainly not the only one) of the set of assets
that allows to establish the decentralization result is as follows. For each security j 2 J
we have bj(s) 2 f0; 1g for each s 2 S. The set of securities is then partitioned into the
subsets J S 1;J S 2:::J 1 and we assume that for each s 2 f1; :::; S   1g all securities in J s
promise the payment of one unit for each realization of the shock s = 1; :::; s. Within J s
the securities only distinguish themselves by their collateral requirements. The set of the
promised payo¤s of the securities in J plus the tree (which has a strictly positive payo¤ in
all states) has then a triangular structure.
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We specify next the set of assets which can be used as collateral for these securities. This
set has to be su¢ ciently rich to allow us to establish the completeness of the market. More
specically, there is only one security in J S 1 and only the tree can be used as collateral
for short positions in this security. There are then two securities in J S 2, one collateralized
by the tree, the second one by long positions in the security in J S 1 (in turn collateralized
by the tree). We have four securities in J S 3, one collateralized by the tree, the second
one by the security in J S 1, the third one by the rst security in J S 2 and the fourth one
by the second security in J S 2. Note that in this specication a security can only serve
as collateral for another security if the set of states where the rst one promises a nonzero
payment contains the set of states where the second one promises a payment. This and the
triangular structure of the payo¤s generate a natural seniority structure of the securities,
as their promised payo¤ determines their ability to serve as collateral for other securities.
More formally, a security is identied by a pair (C; s) 2 f0; 1gS 1  S, specifying that
the security promises the payment of one unit in the shock realizations s = 1; :::; s and is
collateralized - either directly or indirectly - by the securities identied by an element of
the set f0; 1gS 1, where the rst element refers to the tree - which can be identied, with
some abuse of notation, with J S - and the other elements to the securities in, respectively,
J S 1;J S 2:::J 2: The convention is that Cs = 0 if no security in J s is used either directly
or indirectly as collateral of the security under consideration. So C = (1; 0; :::; 0) means that
only the tree is used as collateral, C = (1; 0; 1; 0; ::::) implies that the collateral is given by
the security in J S 2 which in turn is collateralized by the tree. At the other extreme we have
the case C = (1; ::::; 1) 2 f0; 1gS 1 indicating that the security is collateralized by a security
in J 2 which is collateralized by a security in J 3 and so on. Given the seniority structure
described above, for any security (C; s); C must be such that its elements s; s   1; ::; 1 are
all zero.
The two securities (C; s) and (C 0; s) are then identical in terms of promised payo¤s but
di¤ers for their collateral requirements. The collateral requirements induce an additional,
lexicographic ordering among the securities with the same promised payo¤: i.e. C l C 0 if
CS > C
0
S or if CS i = C
0
S i for all i = 1; :::; n  1 and CS n > C 0S n (that is, the securities
serving, either directly or indirectly, as collateral are more senior, in a lexicographic sense,
in C than in C 0). It is also convenient to denote by j = (C; s) the security that needs to
be used directly as collateral for (C; s). We assume that, as already implicit in the above
construction, exactly one security must be used as collateral, this security must belong to
one of the sets J s+1; : : : ;J S . Conversely, for each (C; s) and each s < s, there is exactly
one asset in J s that uses (C; s) directly as collateral, and we denote this by  1((C; s); s).
We complete the description of the collateral requirements of the various securities by
specifying the level of (direct) collateral requirement for each security (C; s) in any given
state st. If a security is directly collateralized by the tree, i.e. if (C; s) 2 J S , then
kC;s(C;s)(s
t) = k(st)  min
st+1st
1
q(st+1) + d(st+1)
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The direct collateral requirement in terms of all other nancial assets is simply one. In
other words
kC;s(C;s)(s
t) = 1 if (C; s) =2 J S :
Note that this specication implies that in any given state the actual payo¤ of a security is
either zero or an amount proportional to the value of the tree plus its dividends,
f(C;s)(s
t) 2 f0; k(st 1)  q(st) + d(st)g: (7)
More precisely, it is zero for all s > s and nonzero (proportional to the payo¤ of the tree)
in all other states, and is then independent of C.
To show the equivalence (in allocations) between nancial market equilibria with the
above asset structure and collateral constraints and collateral constrained Arrow Debreu
equilibria, it is easier show the equivalence with the equilibria with intermediaries. Consider
any equilibrium with intermediaries, with prices q(st; s) and portfolios h(st; s) of the tree
options, for all h; s; st. We show in what follows that we can construct prices for the tree
q(st) and all the securities in J , p(st); as well as portfolios h(st; s); h(st; s) that support the
same consumption allocation at a nancial markets equilibrium with collateral constraints.
Note rst that, as shown in (7), the payo¤ of each security is proportional to the payo¤ of
a tree option. Set then the price of the tree equal to q(st) =
P
s2S q(s
t; s) and the security
prices at
p(C;s)(s
t) =
sX
s=1
k(st)q(st; s):
For each node st portfolio holdings are constructed as follows. Set the tree holdings for
each agent h at the level h(st) = h(st; S). We denote the holdings of nancial security
(C; s) by h(C;s)(s
t). For all agents h 2 H let
h((1;0;:::;0);S 1)(s
t) =

h
(st; S   1)  h(st)
k(st)
:
With this construction, the portfolio pays the same as the tree options in the shock real-
izations st+1 = S and S   1 next period. In order to guarantee the same payo¤s also in the
other shock realizations st+1 = 1; :::; S   2 while satisfying at the same time the collateral
requirements, dene recursively for each s = S   2; S   3; : : : ; 1, for each h = 1; :::;H
h(s) =

h
(st; s)  h(st)
k(st)
 
X
C
S 1X
i=s+1
h(C;i)(s
t);
with the convention that h(C;i)(s
t) = 0 if the security (C; i) does not exist. With this
denition h(s) denotes the total amount of securities promising a nonzero payo¤ in the
shock realizations s = 1; :::; s which needs to be purchased to ensure that the payo¤s of the
portfolio in shock s replicates the payo¤ of the tree option contingent on s.
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To allocate this amount among the di¤erent securities that have the same promised
payo¤ but di¤erent collateral requirements, we need to consider two cases. First, if h(s) <
0; that is the total position is a short one, one needs to ensure that the collateral requirements
are satised. For each asset j that could be used as collateral, that is with higher seniority
than s, we dene Rj(st; s) the amount of that asset that is still available in node st as
possible collateral for j; given the collateral requirements of the holdings of assets promising
to pay in shocks s > s. That is, for the tree, let
RS(st; s) = h(st) + k(st)
 
S 1X
i=s+1
min[0; h((1;0;:::;0);i)(s
t)]
!
;
and set h((1;0;:::;0);s)(s
t) = max[h(s); RS(st;s)k(st) ] for each s. Note that this recursive speci-
cation of h((1;0;:::;0);i) and R
S(st; i) for all i > s ensures that RS(st; s)  0. Similarly, for
each security (C; s^), s^ = s+ 1; ::; S   1, we have
R(C;s^)(st; s) = max
n
h(C;s^)(s
t); 0
o
+
s^X
i=s+1
min[0; h 1((C;s^);i)(s
t)]:
and we set, proceeding recursively now also for C = (1; 1; 0; : : : ; 0); (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0):::
h(C;s)(s
t) = max[h(s) 
X
C0:ClC0
h(C0;s)(s
t); R(C;s)(st; s)]:
The rst term in the above expression is the amount of the total position h(s) that needs
to be allocated to securities with collateral C or below according to the ordering l. The
second term indicates the (opposite of the) amount of collateral that is available for asset
(C; s). implied set so that the collateral. When R(C;s)(st; s) is small, h(C;s)(s
t) is set so
that the collateral constraint holds with equality. It is clear that with this construction the
collateral requirements will be satised and eventually
P
C 
h
(C;s)(s
t) = h(s).
Secondly, we need to consider the case h(s) > 0. Although an agent is indi¤erent
between a long position in security (C; s) and a long position in another security (C 0; s)
the assignment cannot be arbitrary because we need to ensure market clearing, that is we
need to ensure
P
h 
h
(C;s)(s
t) = 0 for all (C; s) in addition to
P
C 
h
(C;s)(s
t) = h(s). But
the validity of the market clearing condition in the tree options ensures that an assignment
satisfying market clearing always exists.
With this construction, agentsbudget constraints hold and markets clear. The resulting
consumption allocation is the same as in the equilibrium with intermediaries and hence the
same as in the collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibrium.
Given the equivalence of the three equilibrium notions presented, in most of the paper
we will focus our attention on the notion which turns out to be more convenient, the one
of equilibria with intermediaries.
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4 A simple example
To illustrate the analysis, we consider the simplest possible example, with two agents, two
states and no aggregate uncertainty. The two shocks are i.i.d. with probabilities 1 and 2.
For simplicity, assume that the tree has a deterministic dividend d and that endowments
of agent 1 are e1(1) = h; e1(2) = l, endowments of agent 2 are e2(1) = l; e2(2) = h, where
0 < l < h. We assume that initial conditions are s0 = 1 and 11(s 1) = 0, i.e. the economy
starts at shocks s = 1 with agent 1 holding no tree.
Depending on the relative size of d; l and h competitive equilibria might be Pareto-
e¢ cient or not, that is, the collateral constraint may be slack or not. We rst derive a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for them to be Pareto-e¢ cient and then examine the case
where they are not.
4.1 E¢ cient equilibria
In this environment with no aggregate uncertainty at a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium agents
consumption is constant, i.e. we must have c1(st) = c1 for all st. Hence the equilibrium
price of the tree must be constant and given by
q =
d
1   :
The constant value of consumption implies then that equilibrium prices of the state-contingent
tree-options are q(s; s0) = s0(q+d), also invariant of the current shock realization s (since
shocks are i.i.d.) and such that q(s; s0) = s0 q for all s.
Given the properties established above of agentsconsumption and equilibrium prices,
the expressions of the budget constraint of type 1 consumers when the shock realization is,
respectively, 1 and 2, are
c1 = h+ 1(q + d)  q(11 + 22) (8)
= l+ 2(q + d)  q(11 + 22);
where 2 is the holding in the tree-option that pays in shock 2 and 1 the holding of the
tree-option paying in shock 1. Solving the rst one for q and substituting it into the second
one yields
2   1 = (h  l)(1  )
d
:
By the market clearing conditions in the securitiesmarket, the holdings of tree options of
type 2 consumers are then (1   1); (1   2). Feasibility, that is the non negativity of the
securitiesholdings for both types of consumers requires that 1; 2 2 [0; 1], which means
that 1  0 and 1 + (h   l)(1  )=d  1. Thus there exists a value of 1 satisfying these
conditions only if
(h  l)(1  )
d
 1: (9)
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If (9) is not satised, a Pareto e¢ cient competitive equilibrium does not exist. On the
other hand, if (9) holds, an e¢ cient competitive equilibrium exists for some appropriate
initial endowment of the tree, equal to the equilibrium portfolio of tree options which for
the type 1 consumers is given by a pair 1  0, 2 = (h l)(1 )d + 1 = (h l)+1(q+d)q+d  1.
The equilibrium price of the tree is q = d1  and the consumption level of type 1 consumers
is obtained by substituting these values into the budget constraints (8). The consumption
level of type 2 consumers obtained from the feasibility conditions is then also constant and
budget feasible. Hence the one described constitutes an e¢ cient, steady state5 equilibrium
with intermediaries.
4.2 Transition to an e¢ cient steady state
Note that the e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria also depends on the initial conditions.
Suppose the e¢ ciency condition (9) holds but initial conditions are s0 = 1 and   :=
11(s ) > 1   h lq+d ; so that the initial endowment of the tree does not coincide with the
portfolio holdings at an e¢ cient steady state.
Collect all histories (nodes) which consist only of shock 1 in a set
1 = fsT = (s0; :::; sT ) : st = 1 for all t = 0; :::; Tg:
We conjecture the following are the portfolios of type 1 consumers at an equilibrium with
intermediaries:
1(st) = ( ; 1); c1(st) = ~c11 if s
t 2 1
and
1(st) = (1  h  l
q + d
; 1), c1(st) = c1 if st =2 1;
where the consumption values ~c11 and c
1 are determined below. Hence for all st =2 1 we
are at an e¢ cient steady state, where prices are q(st) = q = d 1  , q(s
t; s0) = s0d 1  and
consumption levels
c1 = c1(st = 1) = c
1(st = 2) = h+ (1  h  l
q + d
)d  h  l
q + d
2q:
At nodes st 2 1 (i.e. nodes for which only shock 1 occurred up to and including date t),
equilibrium values are also independent of history and given by
q(1; 2) =
u01(c1)
u01(~c11)
2(q + d) (10)
and
q(1; 1) = 1(q(1; 1) + q(1; 2) + d): (11)
5We use the term steady state to refer to situations where the equilibrium variables depend at most on
the current realization of the shock.
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and the associated level of consumption of type 1 consumers is obtained from his budget
constraint, given the above specication of the agents portfolio:
~c11 = h+ (d+ q(1; 1) + q(1; 2))     q(1; 1)    q(1; 2) = h+ d    (1   )q(1; 2):
Substituting this expression for ~c11 into (10) yields one non-linear equation in the unknown
q(1; 2). By a standard argument (e.g. intermediate value theorem) this has a positive
solution associated with positive consumption.
It remains to verify that the consumersoptimality conditions. At the nodes st =2 1
the e¢ cient steady state obtains, for which we already veried these conditions hold at the
above prices and allocations. For nodes st 2 1, for agent 1 this follows from (10) and (11)
above. For agent 2, the rst order condition with respect to asset 1 holds since the agent
is unconstrained (the condition is in fact still given by (11)). It remains to be shown that
the rst order condition with respect to asset 2 holds for the type 2 consumers, who are
constrained (their holdings of asset 2 equals zero)
q(1; 2) >
u02(c2)
u02(~c21)
2(q + d), u
0
1(c
1)
u01(~c11)
>
u02(c2)
u02(~c21)
where ~c21 = h + l + d   ~c11, c2 = h + l + d   c1. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty the
above inequality is equivalent to the condition ~c11 > c
1; hence the consumption of a type 1
consumer must be decreasing when going from state 1 to state 2.
We prove by contradiction that this must be the case. Suppose that ~c11  c1: This
inequality, together with (10) and the corresponding rst order condition at the e¢ cient
steady state, 2q = 2(q+d) would imply that q(1; 2)  2q. But by the budget constraints
the inequality ~c11  c1 is equivalent to
h+ (1  h  l
q + d
)d  h  l
q + d
2q  h+ d    (1   )q(1; 2),
(1  h  l
q + d
   ) (d+q(1; 2))  h  l
q + d
(2q   q(1; 2))
Since in the case under consideration   > (1   h lq+d) the left hand side of the inequality
is always negative. If q(1; 2)  2q the right hand side is non-negative and we obtain a
contradiction. Hence we must have ~c11 > c
1 and the candidate equilibrium satises all the
consumersoptimality conditions, in addition to market clearing.
4.3 Ine¢ cient equilibria
Consider nally the case where (h   l)(1   ) > d, that is the e¢ ciency condition (9) is
violated, so that the only possible equilibrium with intermediaries is an ine¢ cient one,
where the constraints on portfolios bind (at least in some state). We assume that l > 0 and
we show that in the environment of this simple example a steady state equilibrium exists
even in this case, supported by the following steady state portfolios
1 = (0; 1); 2 = (1; 0):
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Note that these are the portfolios supporting an e¢ cient equilibrium if h  l = d=(1  ).
As before, let q(s; 1) and q(s; 2) denote the equilibrium prices in state s of the tree
contingent on states 1 and 2. The budget constraints then imply that
c11 = h  q(1; 2);
c12 = l+ (d+ q(2; 1) + q(2; 2))  q(2; 2) = l+ d+ q(2; 1)
The values of the equilibrium prices must satisfy the rst order conditions of agent 1 for
the security paying in state 2 (since agent 1 is always unconstrained in his holdings of this
asset)
q(1; 2)u01(c
1
1) = 2(q(2; 1) + q(2; 2) + d)u
0
1(c
1
2)
q(2; 2)u01(c
1
2) = 2(q(2; 1) + q(2; 2) + d)u
0
1(c
1
2)
and, by the same argument, of agent 2 for the security paying in state 1
q(1; 1)u02(c
2
1) = 1(q(1; 1) + q(1; 2) + d)u
0
2(c
2
1)
q(2; 1)u02(c
2
2) = 1(q(1; 1) + q(1; 2) + d)u
0
2(c
2
1)
From the second and the third conditions above we obtain that the following relationship
must hold
q(1; 1) =
1
1  1 (q(1; 2) + d)
q(2; 2) =
2
1  2 (q(2; 1) + d)
To complete the proof that a stationary equilibrium exists with the portfolio-holdings
stated above it thus remains to show that the remaining rst order conditions have a solution
for a positive level of the prices q(1; 2), q(2; 1) satisfying h   q(1; 2)  l + d + q(2; 1);6 or
equivalently:
q(1; 2)u01(h  q(1; 2)) =
2
1  2 (q(2; 1) + d)u
0
1(l+ d+ q(2; 1)) (12)
q(2; 1)u02(h  q(2; 1)) =
1
1  1 (q(1; 2) + d)u
0
2(l+ d+ q(1; 2))
Note rst that if there is a positive solution to system (12), it must satisfy h  q(1; 2) 
l+ d+ q(2; 1). Suppose this inequality were not satised; since we are considering the case
where h  l > d1  , we would then have q(1; 2) + q(2; 1) > d1    d = d1  . Furthermore,
u01(l+ d+ q(2; 1))
u01(h  q(1; 2))
< 1 and
u02(l+ d+ q(1; 2))
u02(h  q(2; 1))
< 1:
6This condition ensures that c11  c12 and hence that the no borrowing constraint for security 1 is binding
for agent 1 at the specied consumption levels.
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Substituting these inequalities in (12) yields
q(1; 2) <
2
1  2 (q(2; 1) + d) <
2
1  2

1
1  1 (q(1; 2) + d) + d

Equivalently, by collecting the terms with q(1; 2) on the left hand side and simplifying we
obtain
q(1; 2)(1  ) < 2d:
Symmetrically, we can perform the same operation for q(2; 1) to obtain
q(2; 1)(1  ) < 1d:
Adding up these two inequalities yields a contradiction to the inequality q(1; 2) + q(2; 1) >
d
1  above. Therefore a solution to (12) must always satisfy h  q(1; 2)  l+ d+ q(2; 1).
To show that a positive solution to (12) exists recall the following lemma that follows
directly from Brouwers xed point theorem (see e.g. Zeidler (1985), Proposition 2.8).
Lemma 1 Let f : Rn ! Rn be a continuous function such that
inf
kxk=r
nX
i=1
xifi(x)  0; for some r > 0:
Then f has at least one zero, i.e. there is a x with kxk  r and f(x) = 0.
For su¢ ciently small  > 0, dene g : [ d; h  ]2 ! R2 by
g(x; y) =
(
1 2
2
xu01(h  x)  (y + d)u01(l+ d+ y)
1 1
1
yu02(h  y)  (x+ d)u02(l+ d+ x)
Dene f : R2 ! R2 by
f(x; y) = g (max [ d;min[h  ; x]] ;max [ d;min[h  ; y]]) :
We can apply Lemma 1 for r = h, using the sup-norm and obtain the existence of a zero
point for f and then verify that this must also be a solution to g(x; y) = 0. For x =  r we
obtain
xf1(x; y) + yf2(x; y)  r(y + d)u01(l+ d+ y)  0:
For x = r we obtain that xf1(x; y) can be made arbitrarily large by choosing  appropriately
small while yf2(x; y) is obviously bounded below since we assume l > 0. By symmetry, the
same is true for y 2 f r; rg and there must be an (x; y) with f(x; y) = 0. It is easy to
see that (x; y) 2 (0; h)2 and therefore also solve g(x; y) = 0.
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5 Stationary equilibria
The example demonstrates that in this model there might exist steady state equilibria where
consumption and prices only depend on the exogenous shock. In general one would expect
current prices and consumption to also depend on an endogenous state, typically the current
distribution of assets across agents. The question is then whether along the equilibrium path
this endogenous state takes nitely many or innitely many values. If it takes nitely many
values, the equilibrium can be characterized by a nite system of equations, it can typically
be computed easily and one can conduct local comparative statics using the implicit function
theorem. In this case, we say that there exists a nite-support equilibrium (the stochastic
process of the exogenous and endogenous state has nite support). While the example
above obviously is one case of a nite support equilibrium, it turns out that in our model
these equilibria exist for much more general specications of preferences and endowments.
In this section we give su¢ cient conditions for there to exist Markov equilibria and for these
Markov equilibria to be nite-support equilibria.
5.1 Markov equilibria
While the naturalendogenous state space consists of beginning-of-period nancial wealth
across all agents, it turns out that the analysis is simplied if one does not take the dis-
tribution of wealth as the endogenous state variable but instead works with the agents
instantaneous Negishi weights, i.e. the weighted share of current consumption. Formally
we take the endogenous state at some node st to be (st) 2 RH++ where
(c1(st); : : : ; cH(st)) 2 arg max
X
h2H
h(s
t)uh(c
h) s.t.
X
h2H
(ch   !h(st)) = 0:
Strictly speaking, since these weights are endogenous they cannot be state variables, but the
discussion in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) on the choice of state-variables in this model
also applies here. Any collection of endogenous variables could serve as co-state variables
as long as there is a mapping between the equilibrium values of these and the equilibrium
values of all other endogenous variables at a given date-event.
Negishis (1960) approach to proving existence of a competitive equilibrium of course
shows that instead of solving for consumptions that clear markets, one can solve for weights
that enforce budget balance, see also Dana (1993). Judd et al. (2003) show how to use this
approach to compute equilibria in Lucas style models with complete markets (and without
collateral constraints). Cuoco and He (2001) formulate recursive equilibria in models with
incomplete markets with this choice of an endogenous state. Finally, as already said in the
Introduction Chien and Lustig (2010) (see also Chien et al. (2011)) consider a Markov
equilibrium notion that features individual multipliers - interpretable as the inverse of our
consumption weights - as endogenous state variable in a model with collateral constraints
analogous to ours, though for a di¤erent economy. They then numerically approximate
equilibria with a continuum of agents by nite histories of shocks.
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Obviously we can normalize these weights to sum up to one and can take as the endoge-
nous state space the H   1 dimensional simplex in RH which we denote by H 1. Given
the state space S H 1 a Markov equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium that can be
described by a policy function, C : S H 1 ! RH+ , that maps the current state to current
consumption across all agents and a transition function , L : S H 1 ! H 1 that maps
the current endogenous state and next periods shock to next periods endogenous state.
By denition of the endogenous state, the policy function is obviously given by
C(s; ) = arg max
c2RH+
X
h2H
huh(c
h) s.t.
X
h2H
(ch   !h(s)) = 0: (13)
It is useful to dene (in a slight abuse of notation)
u0h(s; ) = u
0
h

Ch(s; ); s

The following theorem characterizes the transition function.
Theorem 1 A policy function C : SH 1 ! RH+ together with a function L : SH 1 !
H 1 describe a Markov equilibrium if there are excess expenditure functions V h : SH 1 !
R for all agents h 2 H that satisfy
V h(s; ) = u0h(s; ))

Ch(s; )  eh(s)

+ 
X
s0
(s; s0)V h(s0; L(s0; ))
as well as
L(s0; ) =
1P
h2H h + h
(+ )
for some  2 RH+ with hV h(s0; L(s0; )) = 0 and V h(s0; L(s0; ))  0 for all s0 2 S.
Proof. Given functions (C; V; L) and any 0 2 H 1++ , we need to verify that there
exist initial conditions and a collateral constrained Arrow Debreu equilibrium with ch(st) =
Ch(st; (s
t)) and (st) = L(st; (st 1)). Dene (s0) = 1 and
(st) = (st 1)(st 1; st) max
h2H
u0h(st; (s
t))
u0h(st 1; (st 1))
:
Agent hs rst order conditions for optimal consumption at some node st can be written as
follows.
t(st)u0h(c
h(st); st)  h(st) +
X
:st
h()(st) = 0
h(st)
X
st
()(ch()  eh()) = 0;
for multipliers h  0 (associated with the standard budget constraint) and h()  0
(associated with the collateral constraint (4) at node ). It is standard to show that for
summable and positive prices these conditions, together with the budget inequalities (3)
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and (4) are necessary and su¢ cient for a maximum (see e.g. Dechert (1982)). But then at
each st and for all agents h = 2; :::;H we have
u01(c1(st); st)
u0h(ch(st); st)
=
1  P:st 1()
h  P:st h()
which is equivalent to the rst order conditions of (13) if 1=h() = h 
P
:st 
h() for
all h; . It remains to be shown that the budget inequalities (4) as well as the market clearing
conditions are satised. The latter is obvious, given (13). Regarding the budget inequalities
we need to show that V h(st; (st)) = 0 if and only if
P
st ()(c
h()  eh()) = 0. Since
for any agent h 2 H, (st+1)(st) =
u0h(st+1;(s
t+1))
u0h(st;(st))
whenever V h(st+1; (st+1)) 6= 0 this follows
from the denition of V h. 
Note that if there is a competitive equilibrium with (st) =  for all st, then this must
be an Arrow Debreu equilibrium without collateral constraints. The fact that (st) does not
change over time implies that the addition constraint (4) is never binding in equilibrium.
The equilibrium allocation is identical with the unconstrained Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
allocation and it is Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, if for a given Markov equilibrium there
exists a  with V h(s; )  0 for all s 2 S and all h 2 H then there exist initial conditions
(leading to a weight ) for which the Markov equilibrium is identical to an unconstrained
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. By denition of the transition function L(s; :) we have L(s; ) =
 for all s and the multiplier remains constant across the innite tree.
Independently of the choice of the endogenous state, it is impossible to even prove the
general existence of a Markov equilibrium in this model (see Kubler and Schmedders (2003)).
However unlike in the model with incomplete markets, in this model the assumption that all
agentspreferences satisfy the gross substitute property (see Dana (1993) for an application
of this assumption to an innite horizon model) implies that Markov equilibria always
exist. As pointed out by Dana (1993) in our context the assumption of gross substitutes is
equivalent to assuming that all agents h and all shocks s, c u0h(c; s) is increasing in c. We
have then the following:
Theorem 2 Suppose that for all agents h and all shocks s, c u0h(c; s) is increasing in c for all
c > 0. Then there exists a Markov equilibrium.
The proof is somewhat lengthy and is relegated to the Appendix. The main idea of the
proof is to use Danas (1993) insight to show that gross substitutability implies uniqueness
of a zero of the excess expenditure map as a function of multipliers.
In the following, we give su¢ cient conditions that ensure not only the existence of
Markov equilibria but in fact the existence of nite support equilibria.
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5.2 Markov equilibria with nite support
The main di¢ culty in determining if there exist Markov equilibria with nite support lies
in specifying the support. We will show in the next section that, for the case of two agents,
H = 2; there is a natural characterization of the support. We will then extend the analysis
to the case of arbitrarily many agents.
5.2.1 Finite support Markov equilibria in economies with two agents
In this section we focus on the case where there are only two types of agents. This allows
us to denote by  = 1 the value of the consumption weight for agent 1 and take this as a
state variable. In a slight abuse of notation, we write then Ch(s; ) = Ch(s; (; 1  )).
It turns out that for two agents the existence of a Markov equilibrium implies the
existence of a nite support equilibrium. This will be made precise below. For now we
conjecture that there are Markov equilibria where at most 2S points in the endogenous
state space are visited. We denote them by (s; 

s)s2S .
For any  2 [; 1 ]S and  2 [; 1 ]S and all s we can dene a function L : S[0; 1]!
[0; 1] by
L(;)(s; ) =
8><>:
 if s    s
s if  < s
s if  > s:
For each h = 1; 2, dene 2S2 numbers V h(s; ~s) and V
h(s; ~s) for s; ~s 2 S to be the solution
to the following linear system of 2S2 equations.
V h(s; ~s) = u
0
h(s; ~s)

Ch(s; ~s)  eh(s)

+ 
X
s0
(s; s0)V h(s0; L(;)(s
0; ~s)); (14)
V h(s; ~s) = u
0
h(s; ~s)

Ch(s; ~s)  eh(s)

+ 
X
s0
(s; s0)V h(s0; L(;)(s
0; ~s)): (15)
Clearly, the solution to this system will depend non-linearly on the choice of (s; s)s2S
which determine both the transition function L(;) and the value of the terms u
0
h(s; ~s)
 
Ch(s; ~s)  eh(s)

.
Given any (; ) part of this solutions consist of the 2S numbers V 1(s; s), V
2(s; )s for
all s 2 S. We want to show that there exist S pairs (s; s) with
V 1(s; s) = V
2(s; 

s) = 0 for all s 2 S: (16)
We will then show below how to construct a Markov equilibrium whose support is a subset
of these values (s; 

s)s2S . These 
;  determine the boundaries of the intervals where
V 1(s; )  0 and V 2(s; )  0.
To show existence of a solution of (14)-(16), we can substitute out all V 1(s; ~s) and
V 2(s; ~s) as well as all V
1(s; ~s) and V
2(s; ~s) for s 6= ~s. We obtain a function f : [; 1  
]2S ! R2S , where each fi, i = 1; :::; S is the weighted sum of terms of the form
u01(s; ~s)
 
C1(s; ~s)  e1(s)

and u01(s; ~s)
 
C1(s; ~s)  e1(s)

; (17)
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where the weights on the terms involving s are positive (bounded away from zero) if and
only if there is an s0 with s0 > s (recall that (s; s0) > 0 for all s; s0). Similarly each fi
with i = S + 1; :::; 2S is a weighted sum of terms
u02(s; ~s)
 
C2(s; ~s)  e2(s)

and u02(s; ~s)
 
C2(s; ~s)  e2(s)

; (18)
where the weights on the terms involving s are positive if and only if there is an s
0 with
s0 < s. We obtain that f(1; 1; : : : ; S ; S) = 0 precisely when there exists a solution to
(14) and (15) with
V 1(s; s) = V
2(s; s) = 0 for all s 2 S:
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 There exist x 2 [; 1  ]2S with f(x) = 0.
Proof.
The Lemma follows directly by applying Lemma 1 to a slight modication of the function
f(:). For this let, for x 2 [; 1   ]2S , gi(x) = fi(x) for i = 1; :::; S and gi(x) =  fi(x)
for i = S + 1; :::; 2S. Extend then the function g to the whole domain R2S by setting it
continuous and constant outside of [; 1   ]2S . All one needs to prove is the appropriate
boundary behavior. Clearly as some s is su¢ ciently large or some s is su¢ ciently small,
we have that
P
i xigi(x) < 0 since each fi(x) is bounded above. The key is to show that if
s is su¢ ciently small, or if s is su¢ ciently large, we also have that some jgi(x)j becomes
arbitrarily large. To show this note that in (18) the terms involving s have positive (and
bounded away from zero) weight whenever whenever there is a s0 with s0 < s. If this
is the case clearly some fi(x), i = 1; :::; S can be made arbitrarily small, if it is not the
case then clearly some s0 becomes arbitrarily close to 1 and we are in the case above. The
argument for s is analogous. 
Note that given a solution to the system (14)-(16) we can dene functions V h : S 
(0; 1)! R as follows.
V 1(s; ) = u01(s; )(C
1(s; )  e1(s)) + 
X
s0
(s; s0)V 1(s; L(;)(s; ))
V 2(s; ) = u02(s; )(C
2(s; )  e2(s)) + 
X
s0
(s; s0)V 2(s; L(;)(s; ))
It is easy to verify that these functions together with the transition function L(;)(s; :)
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1 above and therefore describe a Markov equilibrium if
the transition function satises
L(;)(s
0; s) = 

s ) V h(s0; s)  0 for h = 1; 2: (19)
L(;)(s
0; s) = 

s ) V h(s0; s)  0 for h = 1; 2: (20)
23
If this is the case, L(;)(:) describes a transition function that ensures that V
h(s; L(s; )) 
0 for all .
In order to nd conditions on the fundamentals that ensure that (19) and (20) hold, it
is useful to dene functions ~V h(s; ) = 1
u0h(s;)
V h(s; ) for h = 1; 2. It is easy to see that ~V
satises the following.
~V 1(s; ) = C1(s; )  e1(s) + 
X
s0:2[
s0 ;

s0 ]
(s; s0)
u01(s0; )
u01(s; )
~V 1(s0; )
+
X
s0:<
s0
(s; s0)
u01(s0; 

s0)
u01(s; )
V 1(s0; s0)
~V 2(s; ) = C2(s; )  e2(s) + 
X
s0:2[
s0 ;

s0 ]
(s; s0)
u02(s0; )
u02(s; )
~V 2(s0; )
+
X
s0:>s0
(s; s0)
u02(s0; 

s0)
u02(s; )
V 2(s0; s0)
for all s with  2 [s; s]. It is standard to show that these equations always have a solution
A su¢ cient condition for (19) and (20) to hold is of course that each ~V h(s; :) has a
unique zero. In this case, it must be that for both h = 1; 2, V h(s; ) is non-negative for all
 2 [; ].
To guarantee this we make the following strong assumption on preferences
Assumption 2 One of the following properties holds for preferences
1. All agents coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is below 1.
2. All agents have identical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
3. Utility is shock-independent and there is no aggregate uncertainty
The assumption guarantees that ~V h(s; :) is monotone for all s and both h = 1; 2. We
prove the result for h = 1, the case h = 2 is of course analogous. If all agentsrelative risk
aversion is below 1, the utility satises the gross substitute property and the result follows
from the proof of Theorem 2. Assume that agents have identical CRRA utility. Then
the term u0h(s
0; )=u0h(s; ) is independent of . Therefore  only enters through the term
C1(s; ), which is clearly increasing in  and through the term (s; s0)u
0
1(s
0;s0 )
u01(s;)
V 1(s0; s0)
which is also increasing in  since u01(s; ) is decreasing in . Therefore the function V 1
must be monotonically increasing. Finally, if there is no aggregate uncertainty, the term
u0h(s
0; )=u0h(s; ) is simply equal to 1 and the same argument as for identical CRRA utility
functions applies.
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Note that by the previous arguments we have shown that Assumption 2. guarantees the
existence of a Markov equilibrium with nite support. We have then the following result:7
Theorem 3 Under any of the conditions of Assumption (2) there exists a nite support Markov
equilibrium in economies with two agents.
Note that in this construction the intervals ([s; 

s])s2S uniquely dene (V h(s; ~s); V h(s; ~s))
h2H
s;~s2S).
Therefore, in the case of two agents, if Markov equilibria exist, they can be described by
2S number which the boundaries of the intervals in multiplier space which are feasible in
equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium dynamics of these simple equilibria are straightfor-
ward. If one starts at an initial condition which corresponds to a welfare weight on the
boundary of the intervals only nitely many di¤erent welfare weights are visited along the
equilibrium. Since (19) and (20) constitute a nite number of inequalities it can be veried
numerically if a Markov equilibrium exists this is an important advantage of nite support
equilibria. If equilibria have innite support it is often extremely di¢ cult to conduct error
analysis given a computed approximate Markov equilibrium (see Kubler (2011)).
5.2.2 Transition and an example
As we have seen in the example in Section 4, a Pareto-e¢ cient steady state may exist but,
depending on the initial conditions it might take arbitrarily long to reach this steady state.
This can be easily explained in this framework. It is useful to reconsider the example.
Suppose that h   l = d1  and suppose for simplicity that u1(c) = u2(c) = log(c) and
 = 1=2. Denote aggregate endowments by ! = h+ l+ d.
As we have seen in Section 4 above there exists a unique e¢ cient steady state where
each agentsconsumption is given by !2 . At this steady state, we must have  =
1
2 . As
we pointed above, Theorem 1 implies that a Markov equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient, if for
some , we have V h(s; )  0 for all h and all s. In this example, since agent 1 has high
endowments in shock 1, we must have 1 > 2 and if there is an e¢ cient equilibrium, we
must also have that 1 = 2 = 1=2. In order to show that this e¢ cient Markov equilibrium
exists one needs to verify that since h  l = d1  the solution to
V 1(1; 1) = 1 
h
0:5!
+

2
 
V 1(1; 1) + V
1(2; 1)

V 1(2; 1) = 1 
l
0:5!
+

2
 
V 1(1; 1) + V
1(2; 1)

satises V 1(1; 1) = 0 and V
1(2; 1) > 0 and that the analogue holds for agent 2. If
V 1(1; 1) = 0 then V
1(2; ) = 11 =2(1  l0:5! ) and
V 1(1; ) = 1  h
0:5!
+

2
V 1(2; 1) =
l+ d  h
!
+
(h+ d  l)
(2  )!
7 In an earlier working paper version of their published paper, Chien and Lustig also characterize equilibria
with nite support for the case of two shocks and two agents with identical CRRA utility. Our result holds
for any number of shocks under more general conditions.
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Therefore V 1(1; ) = 0 whenever (2   )(l + d   h) + (h + d   l) = 0 which is precisely
equivalent to our assumption that h  l = d1  .
We can also solve for 1 and 2 by observing that by denition of  we have that
V 1(2; 2) = 0 = 1 
l
2!
:
Therefore, we obtain 2 =
l
! < 1=2.
As pointed out above, this completely characterizes the Markov equilibrium for this
example. If initial conditions are such that the initial 0 = 1=2 the Markov equilibrium is
identical with the e¢ cient steady state. On the other hand, if, for example , 0 = 2 and
the only shock 2 occurs, then, since V h(2; 2)  0 for both h = 1; 2 the state variable will
remain at the value 0 and agent 1 will consume less than 1/2 until shock 1 occurs. In this
case V 1(1; 1) < 0 and  must jumpto 1 where it will stay from there on.
Note that from the same argument, it is easy to see that we must have 1 > 2 whenever
h   l > d1  . In this case, there is no e¢ cient steady state and along the equilibrium the
instantaneous weight  takes values in f2; 1g.
More generally, if there exists an e¢ cient steady state, there is a  such that V h(s; ) 
0 for all h 2 H and all shocks s 2 S. In the simple framework with 2 agents under
Assumption 2, the sets f : V h(s; )  0 for all h 2 Hg are intervals for each s. An e¢ cient
steady state exists if they overlap, i.e. if there is a  that lies in each interval. In the
case above of only two shocks it is then obvious that this steady state will certainly be
reached if both shocks realized. In the case of more than 2 shocks one can easily see that
an e¢ cient steady state, if it exists, must be certainly reached after each shock has realized
once. Again, with probability 1, the equilibrium converges to the e¢ cient steady state if it
exists. This argument is correct even if there is aggregate uncertainty. By the denition of
the transition function L(;) it is clear that if there exists a 
 with s    s for all
s 2 S this  describes a Pareto-e¢ cient steady state. Moreover, it is clear that in this case
after each shock realized along a path, the economy must be at some ~ which describes an
e¢ cient steady state.
5.2.3 Existence and non-existence of nite support equilibria when H > 2
To extend our analysis to more than 2 agents, we conjecture that the criticalpoints in
H 1 are those values of  for which excess expenditure is zero for all but one agent. That
is, we conjecture that in the Markov equilibria the endogenous state () only takes value in
the nite set
C = f1(1); : : : ; 1(H)); 2(1); : : : ; S(H)g;
where V h(s; s(~h)) = 0 whenever h 6= ~h:
Given any
C = f1(1); : : : ; 1(H)); 2(1); : : : ; S(H)g;
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dene
LC(s; ) =
(
s(h) if 9  0; h = 0 : s(h) = +P
i(i+i)
 otherwise:
(21)
We assume that the points in C are arranged to ensure that LC(s; ) is uniquely dene for
all  2 H 1.
Analogously to the two-agent case, for all s; ~s 2 S and all h; ~h 2 H, the values s(h) 2 C
together with V h(~s; s(~h)) are dened to be a solution the following system of non-linear
equations, for all s; ~s and all h; ~h,
V h

s; ~s(~h)

= u0h(s; ~s(~h))

Ch(s; ~s(~h))  eh(s)

+ 
X
s02S
(s; s0)V h(s0; LC(s0; )); (22)
V h(s; s(~h)) = 0 whenever h 6= ~h: (23)
In this setup it is no longer guaranteed that this system has a solution, but as before
a simple additional condition ensures that a possible solution constitutes the nite support
of a Markov equilibrium.
Theorem 4 Suppose for all s 6= s0 and all h 2 H the following holds.
LC(s0; s(h)) = 

s(h)) V ~h(s0; s(h))  0 for all ~h 2 H; (24)
If initial conditions are such that h(s 1) = 1 for some agent h, then there exists a nite support
Markov equilibrium with
(st) = LC(st; (st 1)) for all st:
The proof of the theorem follows directly from our recursive characterization above.
The construction does not directly give us correspondences V and L that are dened over
the entire trimmed simplex H . However, the key insight is that if a solution to equations
(22), (23) exists and if it satises (24) (and if initial conditions are on the boundary of the
portfolio-space) then there exists an equilibrium where the multipliers  take values only in
the nite set fs(h); h 2 H; s 2 Sg. It su¢ ces to know the values of V and L on this nite
set in order to verify whether we have a competitive equilibrium. Equations (22) and (23)
specify the values of V on this set, while condition (24) guarantees that the denition of
the transition in (21) is consistent with the rst order conditions. Note that of course for
this one needs to impose an initial condition that guarantees that the initial value of  also
lies in this nite set.
Unfortunately, for the general case with more than 2 agents we do not know of condi-
tions which ensure the existence of nite support Markov equilibria. However, given the
characterization we can obviously reverse-engineer cases where equilibria have nite sup-
port. For example suppose there are 3 agents and three equi-probable iid shocks. To make
calculations simple assume the agents have identical utility functions. Endowments are
e1 = (h; h; l), e2 = (l; h; h) and e3 = (h; l; h) for some 0 < l < h. The tree pays constant
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dividends d > 0. By symmetry, assuming the right initial conditions, we can focus on the
case where agents 1 and 2 are possibly constrained in state 1, agents 2 and 3 in state 2
and agents 1 and 3 in state 3. Given are notation above, we can therefore focus on nding
values for 1(3); 2(1) and 3(2).
As in the introductory example above if d or  are su¢ ciently large relative to h   l,
(22), (23). 0B@ V
h(1; 1(3))
V h(2; 1(3))
V h(3; 1(3))
1CA = (I   ) 1
0B@ C
h(1; 1(3))  eh
Ch(2; 1(3))  eh
Ch(3; 1(3))  eh
1CA :
Direct computation then gives 1(3) by solving V 1(1; 1(3)) = V 2(1; 1(3)) = 0. One
can verify that, similarly to the example above, one obtains 1(3) = 2(1) = 3(2) =
(1=3; 1=3; 1=3). If d1  < h  l we can in fact verify that the economy will only visit the three
welfare weights 1(3); 2(1); 3(2). Since utilities are identical, everything is symmetric and
consumptions are
c1 = (ch; ch; cl); c2 = (cl; ch; ch); c3 = (ch; cl; ch):
6 Welfare Properties
In this section we investigate the welfare properties of competitive equilibria with collateral
constraints. In the simple example considered in Section 4, equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient
whenever d=(1 ) > h l; that is when the amount of available collateral is su¢ ciently large
relative to some measure of the variability of agentsendowments. In this section we will
generalize this result and derive some necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of
Pareto e¢ cient equilibria when shocks are i.i.d. and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Next,
we turn our attention to the welfare properties of equilibria when the collateral constraint
binds so that competitive equilibria are Pareto ine¢ cient, showing that there is a sense in
which they are also constrained ine¢ cient. That is, even by taking the limited pledgeability
constraints into account, a welfare improvement can still be obtained with respect to the
competitive equilibrium.
6.1 Pareto E¢ cient equilibria
It is well known that in the stationary economy considered in this paper Pareto e¢ cient
allocations are always stationary, i.e. consumption only depends on the current shock (see
e.g. Judd et al. (2003)). As in Section 4.1 we dene a steady state to be an equilibrium
where individual consumption and prices are time invariant functions of the shock alone.
It follows again from Judd et al. (2003) that at such an equilibrium portfolios will be
constant, i.e. will not depend on the shock. On the other hand equilibrium prices may
depend on the current realization of the shock. Formally, a steady state equilibrium consists
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of prices of the tree options (q(s; s0)s2S;s02S 2 RS2 (where s is the current realization of
the shock and s0 identies the realization of the shock next period in which the security
promises the delivery of the tree), consumption levels (ch(s))s2S;h2H 2 RHS+ and portfolios

h
s0

s02S;h2H
2 RHS+ such that for an economy with initial conditions h(s 1) = hs0 a
competitive equilibrium obtains at the values
 
(h(st); ch(st))h2H; q(st)

: ch(st) = ch(st);
and, for all s0 2 S, q(st; s0) = q(st; s0), hs0(st) = hs0 .
Therefore a competitive equilibrium can only be Pareto e¢ cient if it is a steady state
equilibrium. As shown in the example of Section 4, even when an e¢ cient steady state
exists, for some initial conditions it may not be reached immediately. With a slight abuse
of notation, we then say that Pareto e¢ cient equilibria exist if, there are initial conditions for
which the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient (and therefore is a steady state equilibrium).
At a steady state equilibrium, the budget constraints of each consumer can be reduced
to the following nite system of equations
A(q) =
0BB@
c(1)  eh(1)
...
c(S)  eh(S)
1CCA ;   0: (25)
where the matrix A(q) is dened as follows:
A(q) =
0BBBBB@
d(1) +
P
s0 q(1; s
0)  q(1; 1)  q(1; 2); : : :  q(1;S)
 q(2; 1) d(2) +Ps0 q(2; s0)  q(2; 2); : : :  q(2;S)
...
...
. . .
...
 q(S; 1)  q(S; 2); : : : d(S) +Ps0 q(S; s0)  q(S;S)
1CCCCCA :
Hence, from (25) it follows that a Pareto e¢ cient allocation (ch(s))s2S;h2H can be im-
plemented as a steady state equilibrium if and only if, for all agents h,8
A(q) 1
0BB@
ch(1)  eh(1)
...
ch(S)  eh(S)
1CCA  0: (26)
where q are the supporting prices, determined by the allocation as follows. Dene, for all
s = 1; :::; S; (s; s0) = u0h(s
0)=u0h(s), where we use the shorthand notation u
0
h(s) to denote
u0h(c
h(s)) for each s 2 S: Note that by the Pareto e¢ ciency of the allocation u0h(s0)=u0h(s)
is h-invariant for all s; s0. From the consumersoptimality conditions we then see that the
securitiesprices must satisfy the following system of equations
q(s; s0) = (s; s0)(s; s0)
 X
s00
q(s0; s00) + d(s0)
!
, s; s0 2 S: (27)
8 It is immediate to verify that the matrix A(q) dened above is always invertible.
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To solve this system it is convenient to nd rst the prices of the tree in every state
s 2 S, q(s) = Ps0 q(s; s0), which satisfy the following system of S equations
q(s) = 
X
s0
(s; s0)(s; s0)
 
q(s0) + d(s0)

, s 2 S. (28)
Having found the supporting price of the tree in each state, the price of each contingent
claim readily obtains from the equations
q(s; s0) = (s; s0)(s; s0)
 
q(s0) + d(s0)

, s; s0 2 S (29)
In general, condition (26) is di¢ cult to interpret since it involves equilibrium allocations
and the supporting prices. However, when there is no aggregate uncertainty (
P
h e
h(s) =P
h e
h(s0) and d(s) = d(s0) = d for all s; s0), the condition takes a simpler and tractable
form. In that case in fact a Pareto e¢ cient allocation satises ch(s) = ch for all s, so that the
value of the supporting prices of the tree are, for all s, q(s) = q := d1  and the securities
prices are q(s; s0) = (s; s0)q. Under the additional condition that shocks are i.i.d. ((s; s0)
is s invariant), the expression of the consumers budget constraints in (25) simplies to0BBBBB@
d+ (1  1)q  2q : : :  S q
 1q d+ (1  2)q : : :  S q
...
...
. . .
...
 1q  2q : : : d+ (1  S)q
1CCCCCA  =
0B@ c
h   eh(1)
...
ch   eh(S)
1CA ; (30)
which implies that for, any pair of states s and s0 we have
s   s0 = e
h(s0)  eh(s)
q + d
(31)
So a necessary condition for the existence of an e¢ cient steady state in the case of no
aggregate uncertainty and i.i.d. shocks is that for all shocks s; s0 and any subset of agents
G  H we have9 X
h2G
eh(s0)  eh(s)
q + d
 1: (32)
This condition says that the amount of available collateral, as measured by q + d = d1  ,
is larger than the variability of the endowment of any subset of consumers across any pair
of states. Conversely, the following argument shows that if condition (32) is satised, there
exists a Pareto e¢ cient allocation that can be decentralized as a steady state equilibrium,
for some appropriate initial conditions. Pick an arbitrary h 2 H. For each h 2 H=h, set
hs^ = 0 for s^ : e
h(s^)  eh(s) for all s 2 S. The remaining values of hs are then determined by
(31) for all h 2 H=h while the corresponding values for h are obtained from market clearing.
It is immediate to verify that if (32) holds, all the values obtained for  are admissible ( 0).
9This condition generalizes the one obtained in the example, given by (9).
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Plugging these values into (30) yields then the value of ch for all h 2 H, which constitute a
Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
We can summarize the above ndings in the following:
Theorem 5 A Pareto e¢ cient steady state exists if the nite set of conditions (26), (28), (29)
are satised for some (q(s; s0); q(s))s;s02S and some Pareto e¢ cient allocation (c
h(s))s2S;h2H.
In the case where there is no aggregate uncertainty and shocks are i.i.d., a Pareto e¢ cient steady
state exists if, and only if, condition (32) holds.
6.2 Constrained ine¢ ciency
If the collateral in the economy is too little to support a Pareto e¢ cient allocation, it could
still be the case that the equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto e¢ cient in the sense
that no reallocation of the resources that is feasible and satises the collateral constraints
can make everybody better o¤. We show here that this is not true, by presenting a robust
example for which a welfare improvement can indeed be found subject to these constraints.
We consider in particular a reallocation obtained by imposing tighter short-sale con-
straints on the trades of some tree options and considering the associated equilibrium where
agents optimize subject to such constraints and markets clear. Such reallocation clearly re-
spects the collateral constraints. At the same time, since the tighter constraints will change
trades and hence securitiesprices, the allocation obtained may not be feasible at the original
prices and looser short-sale constraints, and hence might yield a higher welfare.
We show the result in the simple environment described in Section 4, supposing that
shocks are equiprobable, 1 = 2 = 1=2, consumers have the same preferences, uh(c; s) =
u(c) for h = 1; 2, and their endowment in the low state is zero: l = 0. In addition,
h(1   ) > d, so that (9) is violated and there is no Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium, but an
ine¢ cient steady state equilibrium exists.
Suppose the economy is at this ine¢ cient steady state and consider the welfare e¤ect of
tightening the portfolio restriction to hs (s
t)  ", for " > 0 and all s 2 S. The restriction is
assumed to be introduced at t = 1 and to hold for all t  1. The intervention is announced
at t = 0 after all trades have taken place. Agentsutility is then evaluated ex ante, from
date 0.
We show that this intervention is Pareto improving, for an open set of the parame-
ter values describing the economy. Thus the ine¢ cient steady state equilibrium is also
constrained ine¢ cient: making the collateral constraint tighter in some date events may
improve welfare.
Given the nature of the intervention and the fact that the economy is initially in a steady
state, there is a transition phase of one period before the economy settles to a new steady
state: prices and allocations are then going to depend now on time (whether it is t = 1 or
t > 1) as well as the realization of the current shock. It is useful to use the notation qt(s; s0)
to indicate the price at time t and state s of the tree option that pays in state s0. As before,
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the price of the tree is then qt(s) = qt(s; 1)) + qt(s; 2). The new equilibrium portfolios are,
at all dates t  1; 1 = ("; 1   "), 2 = (1   "; "), that is the short-sale constraint always
binds. At the date of the intervention, date t = 1, we have then
c1(s1 = 1) = h  q1(1; 1)"  q1(1; 2)(1  ")
c1(s1 = 2) = d+ q1(2; 1) + q1(2; 2)  q1(2; 1)"  q1(2; 2)(1  ")
= d+ q1(2; 1)(1  ") + q1(2; 2)"
At all subsequent dates, t > 1,
c1(st = 1) = h+ " (q(1; 1) + q(1; 2) + d)  q(1; 1)"  q(1; 2)(1  ")
= h+ "d  q(1; 2)(1  2")
c1(st = 2) = (d+ q(2; 1) + q(2; 2)) (1  ")  q(2; 1)"  q(2; 2)(1  ")
= d(1  ") + q(2; 1)(1  2")
That is, we settle at the new steady state where qt(s; s0) = q(s; s0) for all t > 1, s; s0.
We have then eight new equilibrium prices to determine. By symmetry (of consumers
preferences, endowments and shocks) however these reduce to four, since q1(1; 1) = q1(2; 2);
q1(1; 2) = q1(2; 1); as well as q(1; 1) = q(2; 2) and q(1; 2) = q(2; 1) for all t = 2; :::.
The equilibrium prices are determined by the rst order conditions for the consumers
optimal choices. At t = 1 in state 1 the price q1(1; 2) of the tree option paying in state 2 is
determined by agent 1s rst order condition, since agent 2 is constrained in that state in
his holdings of that asset. We have so
q1(1; 2)u
0(h q1(1; 1)" q1(1; 2)(1 ")) = 
2
(q(2; 1)+q(2; 2)+d)u0(d(1 ")+q(2; 1)(1 2")):
(33)
For t  2 agent 1s rst order conditions with respect to the tree option paying in state
2 still determine its price in state 1 since agent 2 is constrained in that state. On the other
hand, in state 2 the consumption of both agents is the same as in the subsequent date in
state 2, hence both agents are not constrained in their holdings of the tree options paying
in state 2 and its price is determined by the rst order conditions of any of them (say again
agent 1).
q(1; 2)u0(h+ "d  q(1; 2)(1  2")) = 
2
(q(2; 1) + q(2; 2) + d)u0(d(1  ") + q(2; 1)(1  2"))(34)
q(2; 2)u0 (d(1  ") + q(2; 1)(1  2")) = 
2
(q(2; 1) + q(2; 2) + d)u0(d(1  ") + q(2; 1)(1  2"))(35)
From (35) we obtain for t > 1 that
q(1; 1) = q(2; 2) =
(q(2; 1) + d)
2   (36)
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and therefore
q(2; 1) + q(2; 2) + d =
2(q(2; 1) + d)
2   :
Substituting this expression into Equation (34) we obtain a single equation that can be
solved for q(1; 2) = q(2; 1):
q(2; 1)u0(h+ "d  q(2; 1)(1  2"))  (q(2; 1) + d)
2   u
0(d(1  ") + q(2; 1)(1  2")) = 0: (37)
It is useful to denote by q0(2; 1) the solution of this equation when " = 0 (that is, at the
initial steady state).
Di¤erentiating (37) with respect to ", and evaluating it at " = 0 yields the following
expression:
dq(2; 1)
d"

"=0
=
 
h
 d+q
0(2;1)
2  u
00(d) + q0(2; 1)u00(h)
i
(d+ 2q0(2; 1))
u0(h)  2 u0(d)   d+q
0(2;1)
2  u00(d)  q0(2; 1)u00(h)
(38)
where u0(h) = u0(h   q0(2; 1)) and u0(d) = u0(d + q0(2; 1)) with u00(h) and u00(d) dened
analogously. In the above expression the numerator is clearly positive, and so is the denom-
inator, since equation (37) evaluated at " = 0 yields u0(h) = d+q
0(2;1)
q0(2;1)

2 u
0(d) > 2 u
0(d).
Therefore it is unambiguously the case that dq(2; 1)=d"j"=0 > 0.
To determine the welfare e¤ect of an innitesimal tightening of the portfolio restriction,
that is from " = 0 to d" > 0; note that from the above expressions of the budget constraints
and the symmetry of equilibrium prices we have
dc1(s1 = 1)
d"

"=0
=   dc
1(s1 = 2)
d"

"=0
= q0(2; 1)  (q
0(2; 1) + d)
2    
dq1(1; 2)
d"

"=0
;
where we used the fact that q1(1 1), evaluated at " = 0, equals q(1; 1) and both terms are
at the steady state value before the intervention, (q
0(2;1)+d)
2  . Also,
dc1(st = 1)
d"

"=0
=   dc
1(st = 2)
d"

"=0
= 2q0(2; 1) + d  dq(2; 1)
d"

"=0
:
The e¤ect of the intervention considered on the discounted expected utility of consumer
1 is then
dU
d"

"=0
=
1
2
 
u0(h)  u0(d) dc1(s1 = 1)
d"

"=0
+

2(1  )
 
u0(h)  u0(d) dc1(st = 1)
d"

"=0
:
(39)
By symmetry, the expression for the change in consumers 2 expected utility has the same
value.
From (38) we immediately see that
dq(2; 1)
d"

"=0
< d+ 2q0(2; 1);
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so that dc
1(st=1)
d"

"=0
> 0. Since u0(h) < u0(d) we conclude that the e¤ect of the intervention
considered on agents steady state welfare, given by the second term in (39), is always
negative.
For the intervention to be welfare improving we need then to have a welfare improvement
in the initial period that is su¢ ciently large to compensate for the negative e¤ect after that
period. More precisely, from (39) it follows that dUd"

"=0
is positive if, and only if,
dc1(s1 = 1)
d"

"=0
<   
1  
dc1(st = 1)
d"

"=0
;
or equivalently, substituting the expressions obtained above for the consumption changes
and rearranging terms,
dq1(1; 2)
d"

"=0
>
2q0(2; 1) + d
(2  ) (1  )  

1  
dq(1; 2)
d"

"=0
(40)
For an improvement to obtain, the price change in the rst period, dq1(1;2)d"

"=0
; has then to
be su¢ ciently large. This price change is obtained by di¤erentiating (33) with respect to ",
evaluated at " = 0; when q1(1; 2), q(2; 1) and q1(1; 1); q(2; 2) are at their steady state values
before the intervention, given respectively by q0(2; 1) for the rst two and by (q
0(2;1)+d)
2  for
the last two. Therefore10 we obtain that
dq1(1;2)
d"

"=0
=
q0(2;1)

(q0(2;1)+d)
2   q0(2;1)

u00(h) (q0(2;1)+d)
2  u
00(d)

d+2q0(2;1)  dq(2;1)
d"

"=0

+ 
2  u
0(d) dq(2;1)
d"

"=0
u0(h) q0(2;1)u00(h)
Substituting this expression into the su¢ cient condition for suboptimality we obtained
above, (40), we nd that this, after rearranging terms, is equivalent to the following:
q0(2; 1)(q
0(2;1)+d) (2 )q0(2;1)
2  u
00(h) (q0(2;1)+d)2  u00(d)
 
d+2q0(2; 1)
  (2q0(2;1)+d)(u0(h) q0(2;1)u00(h))(2 )(1 )
+

(u0(h) q0(2;1)u00(h))
1  +

2 u
0(d) + (q
0(2;1)+d)
2  u
00(d)

dq(2;1)
d"

"=0
> 0
or
q0(2; 1) (1  ) d  2 (1  ) q0(2; 1)u00(h)  (1  )(q0(2; 1) + d)u00(d)  d+2q0(2; 1)
   2q0(2; 1) + d  u0(h) q0(2; 1)u00(h)
+

 (2  )  u0(h) q0(2; 1)u00(h)+  (1  )u0(d) + (1  )(q0(2; 1) + d)u00(d) dq(2;1)d" "=0> 0
(41)
This condition is stated in terms of endogenous variables which obviously raises the
question if there are economies for which the equilibrium values satisfy it. We establish
then the following result.
10Note that the price q1(1; 1) also changes with  but, since we evaluate the expression at  = 0; we have
dq1(1;1)
d"
"

"=0
= 0.
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Theorem 6 There are specications of economies in the environment under consideration that
are robust with respect to perturbations in (h; d; ) as well as perturbations of preferences for
which Condition (41) holds and hence the competitive equilibrium is constrained suboptimal.
To prove the theorem, note that from Equation (37) we nd that q0(2; 1) can be written
in term of u0(d) and u0(h),
q0(2; 1) =
d
2 u
0(d)
u0(h)  2 u0(d)
: (42)
Dening ~u0(h) := u
0(h)
u0(d) , ~u
00(h) := u
00(h)
u0(d) , and ~u
00(d) := u
00(d)
u0(d) we obtain that Condition (41) is
equivalent to the condition AB > 0 where
A =
4~u0(h) [1 + d~u00(d) + ~u0(h)]  2 2 + (4 + 3d~u00(d))~u0(h) + 2~u0(h)2 + d~u00(h)+
2
h
1
~u0(h) + (3 + 2d~u
00(d))~u0(h) + ~u0(h)2 + d ~u
00(h)
~u0(h)2 + (3 + d~u
00(h))
i
and
B =
 2~u0(h)2 +   ~u0(h) + ~u0(h)2 + d~u00(h) [4~u0(h)2 + 2(1 + (2 + d~u00(d))~u0(h) + ~u0(h)2 + d~u00(h))
 2((2 + d~u00(d))~u0(h) + 2~u0(h)2 + d~u00(h))]
It can then be easily seen that, since all marginal utilities are evaluated at positive numbers,
that remain bounded away from zero as  ! 0, for su¢ ciently small  we have AB > 0 if
1 + d~u00(d) + ~u0(h) < 0, or equivalently
1 + d
u00(d)
u0(d)
+
u0(h)
u0(d)
< 0:
As shown in Section 4, when h (1  ) > d an ine¢ cient steady state equilibrium exists
with u
0(h)
u0(d) < 1. It then follows that the inequality  du
00(d)
u0(d) > 1 +
u0(h)
u0(d) is satised when the
absolute risk-aversion is su¢ ciently high. Therefore Condition (41) holds and the steady
state equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient whenever the agents absolute risk aversion is
uniformly above 2=d and  is su¢ ciently small. It is clear that this is true for an open set
of parameters and utility functions.
6.2.1 Logarithmic preferences
While Theorem 6 above is all one can say in general, it is useful to illustrate for a given
specication of the agentsutility function how large the set of parameter values is for which
one obtains constrained ine¢ cient equilibria. We consider here the case where u(c) = log(c).
It can be veried that in this case an explicit solution of (42) for the equilibrium price can
be found, given by11
q0(2; 1) = 
h
2
:
11While it may seem surprising that the dividend level d does not appear in this expression of the equilib-
rium price, we should bear in mind that the one considered is an ine¢ cient equilibrium. When an e¢ cient
steady state exists we have in fact q(1; 2) = 
2
d
(1 ) .
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Since utility is homothetic it is without loss of generality to normalize d = 1. Direct
computations then show that
dq1(1; 2)
d"

"=0
=
(1 + h)(1 + h)
2 + h
and
dq(2; 1)
d"

"=0
=
( 4h+ 2h(2 + 3h) + 2(1 + h  2h2)
2(   2)(2 + h) :
According to Equation (40) an improvement is possible if

dqt(1; 2)
d"

"=0
+ (1  ) dq1(1; 2)
d"

"=0
  2q(1; 2) + d
(2  ) > 0
Substituting these expressions into (40) we nd that, in the case of logarithmic prefer-
ences the intervention considered is welfare improving if, and only if
2  (h  2)h+ 2h2 < 0:
Figure 1 then shows, in the space h; , the region of values of these parameters for which
competitive equilibria are constrained ine¢ cient as well as the region where equilibria are
Pareto e¢ cient. We see that the region where constrained ine¢ ciency holds is quite large,
while the region where full Pareto e¢ ciency cannot be attained but still the intervention
considered is not welfare improving is very small.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
7 Quantitative Assessment of the Equilibrium Properties
The ndings of the previous section have important implications for the properties of equi-
librium allocations as well as potentially important policy-implications. In Condition (32)
we identied the minimum amount of collateral that needs to be present, in economies with-
out aggregate uncertainty and without persistence in idiosyncratic shocks, for competitive
equilibria to be fully Pareto-e¢ cient. When available collateral is scarce and violates such
condition, imposing tighter borrowing constraints than the ones imposed by the markets
may lead to welfare improvements. In this section we carry out a quantitative assessment of
the e¢ ciency properties of competitive equilibria for more general and realistic economies
where shocks are persistent, there may be aggregate as well as idiosyncratic uncertainty
and levels of collateral are somewhat realistic.
We consider a set of economies with two types of agents, where there are both aggregate
shocks and persistent idiosyncratic shocks and we allow for di¤erent possible levels of the
idiosyncratic shocks and di¤erent possible degrees of their persistence. For such economies
equilibria can be easily computed numerically by solving a non-linear system of equations.
We provide a quantitative assessment of the values of parameters for which competitive
equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient and, when the equilibrium is ine¢ cient, we determine the
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size of the welfare loss (with respect to the st best level of welfare). We also illustrate the
properties of the pattern of agentsconsumption over time and across states when equilibria
are ine¢ cient.
More precisely, we examine an environment where there are four shocks, S = f1; ::; 4g :
Aggregate endowments are !(1) = !(2) = (1 + ), !(3) = !(4) = (1   ). The tree pays
dividends equal to a fraction  of aggregate endowments: d(s) = !(s) for each s 2 S and
individual non pleadgeable endowments are
e1(1) = e1(3) =  (1  )!(s); e1(2) = e1(4) = (1  ) (1  )!(s)
The aggregate shock is i.i.d. and each of its two realizations has the same probability. In
contrast, the idiosyncratic shock is persistence, with persistence measured by  = 2(1; 1).
Agents have identical CRRA utility with  = 0:95 and a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
of 3.
Regarding the size of the fraction of the economys resources that are pleadgeable, given
by , it is sometimes argued (see e.g. McGrattan and Prescott (2005)) that the share
of output which can be attributed to tangible capital in the US economy is close to 30
percent. This is capital that in principle could be used as collateral and this number would
imply for our model a value  = 0:3. In stark contrast, Chien and Lustig (2011) use NIPA
(National Income and Product Accounts) to estimate tradeable or collateralizable income to
be 10.2 percent of total income. In this, they include rental income, dividends, and interest
payments. As they point out, this is a narrow measure, because it treats proprietary income
as non collateralizable. When proprietary income is included as well, the ratio rises to 19.5
percent. In what follows we will consider these three (10, 20 and 30 percent) possible values
for the share of income that is collateralizable, that is  2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:3g.
As far as the degree of persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks is concerned, we consider
the following possible values for  2 f0:9; 0:95; 0:99g: For the magnitude of these shocks, as
measured by the fraction of aggregate endowment obtained in the good individual state, we
consider the values  2 f0:75; 0:85; 0:95g.
For the magnitude of the aggregate shocks we consider the case  = 0:1, i.e. of substan-
tial aggregate uncertainty. It turns out that the features of the equilibrium values reported
in what follows are almost identical when there is no aggregate uncertainty, i.e. when  = 0.
The presence of aggregate shocks turns out then not to play a quantitatively important role..
We report in the following table the welfare losses at a competitive equilibrium with
collateral constraints with respect to the Arrow-Debreu benchmark (i.e. relative to the
equilibria without collateral constraints). Welfare losses are measured in percent, in wealth
equivalent terms, i.e. we report what fraction of his consumption level at an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium an agent should give up (uniformly across all nodes) in order to attain the same
level of welfare as at the competitive equilibrium with collateral constraints. The initial
conditions are such that at the beginning of period 0 each agent holds half of the tree and
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initially, coming into period 0, all 4 shocks are equally likely.12
   = 0:75  = 0:85  = 0:95
0.1 0.9 0 0. 0.01
0.1 0.95 0.19 0.48 0.70
0.1 0.99 4.47 7.13 8.53
0.2 0.9 0 0 0
0.2 0.95 0 0 0.07
0.2 0.99 0.57 2.54 4.25
0.3 0.95 0 0 0
0.3 0.99 0 0.10 1.16
Table : welfare losses at an equilibrium
The ndings in the table above provide a useful complement to our theoretical analysis
in the previous sections. For the value of  considered here, Condition (32) implies that,
without aggregate uncertainty and with no persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks, an e¢ -
cient competitive equilibrium would exist for all the values of the collateral level  and of
the size of the idiosyncratic shocks  considered in the table. We see from the results in
the table that the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks plays a crucial role for the risk
sharing properties of equilibrium allocations in this economy. When idiosyncratic shocks
are very persistent (and the level of existing collateral is relatively low) potential welfare
losses are quite large. This is in accord with what one nds in a model with incomplete
markets and exogenous borrowing constraints, where equilibria are always ine¢ cient but
welfare losses are quantitatively very small unless shocks are very persistent (see e.g. Kubler
and Schmedders (2001)). In the environment considered here, welfare losses are zero when
the level of collateral is su¢ ciently high ( = 0:3) or when idiosyncratic shocks are not very
persistent ( = 0:9).
It is then useful to examine also the degree of risk sharing at a competitive equilibrium
when Pareto e¢ ciency is not attained. Since we are considering the case where there are
two types of agents with identical CRRA utility, Theorem 3 applies and the equilibrium can
be described by S pairs of numbers (s; s)s2S . For instance, take the case where  = 0:75,
 = 0:1 and  = 0:99. As we see from Table 7, the resulting equilibrium is ine¢ cient and
the pattern of consumption in the long run (at a steady state) is described by the following
values:
State 1 2 3 4
s 0.2250 0.5743 0.2250 0.5889
s 0.4260 0.7752 0.4114 0.7752
Table : risk sharing pattern
12This is slightly di¤erent from the specication adopted in the previous sections, where time runs from
date 0 after s0 has realized, and allows results here not to depend on the initial condition.
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Recall that shocks 1, 3 and 2, 4 represent di¤erent realizations of the idiosyncratic shock,
while 1, 2 versus 3, 4 represent di¤erent aggregate shocks. We see then from the values
in Table 7 that in the long run consumption will change, and signicantly, whenever there
is a change in the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, while there will be no change, or
at most a much smaller change, in consumption when only the realization of the aggregate
shock changes.
It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to take a stand on which values should
be considered as realistic for the level of persistence and the size of the idiosyncratic
shocks as well as for the amount of available collateral. It might be interesting, however,
to consider an example of a calibrated economy from the applied literature. Heaton and
Lucas (1996) calibrate a Lucas style economy with two types of agents to match key facts in
the US economy. They take the dividend-shareto be earnings to stock-market capital and
estimate this number to be around 15 percent of total income. They assume that aggregate
growth rates follow an 8-state Markov chain and calibrate their model using the PSID (Panel
Study of Income Dynamics) and NIPA (National Income and Product Accounts). Let us
consider their calibration for the Cyclical Distribution Casebut detrend the economy to
ensure we remain in our stationary environment. We nd that for their specication of
the economy the competitive equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient in the long run. In fact, the
persistence of the shocks is so small that even with only a 5 (instead of 15) percent level
of collateralizable income, e¢ ciency would still obtain. This shows that, if one considers
the specication of idiosyncratic risks in Heaton and Lucas (1996) to be somewhat realistic,
Pareto ine¢ ciency does not obtain in the long run for all realistic levels of collateral.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered an innite horizon economy with complete markets and
collateral constraints where the only nancial friction is the limit to borrowing imposed
by the existing amount of collateral. We have shown that this is a tractable dynamic
stochastic model, whose equilibria can be computed fairly easily and hence the e¢ ciency
and risk sharing properties of equilibria quantitatively assessed. This is true even though
they can be constrained suboptimal, in the sense that imposing tighter borrowing constraints
at certain nodes of the event tree than the limits imposed by the collateral constraints can
make everybody better o¤.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
We prove existence of a Markov equilibrium by showing that nite horizon truncations
converge monotonically to policy and transition functions when the horizon becomes large.
Throughout the proof we will crucially use the fact that our assumption on preferences
guarantees the so-called gross-substitute property. The following denition and two lemmas
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make this precise.
Definition 1 A function f : Rn+ ! Rn satises the strict gross substitute property if for all
y 2 Rn+ and all x 2 Rn+ with xi = 0 for some i = 1; :::; n it holds fi(y) < fi(y + x).
The following lemma makes clear why this property is crucial for establishing existence.
It is a slight variation of a result by Dana (1993).
Lemma 3 Suppose f : Rn+ ! Rn satises the strict gross substitute property and is homoge-
neous of degree zero. Given any x 2 Rn++ suppose there exist ; 0 2 Rn+ such that f(x+)  0,
f(x + 0)  0 and ifi(x + ) = 0, 0ifi(x + 0) = 0, for all i = 1; :::; n. If both  and 0 are
not strictly positive, i.e. ; 0 =2 RN++ then  = 0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that  6= 0. Without loss of generality we can take
 > 0. Then there must be a j with j > 0 as well as a  > 0 such that (xj+j) = (xj+
0
j)
and (x+ 0) > x+ . The latter inequality holds strict because  6= 0 and because both
are not strictly positive. But since f(:) is homogeneous of degree zero we must have that
fj ((x+ 
0)) = fj(x+ 0)  0 . On the other hand, by the strict gross substitute property
and since j > 0 we must have
fj
 
(x+ 0)

< fj(x+ ) = 0;
which is a contradiction. 
We also need the following result.
Lemma 4 Suppose f : Rn+ ! Rn satises the strict gross substitute property and is homoge-
neous of degree zero. For any x 2 Rn++ and y > x suppose there exist x; y 2 Rn+ such that
f(x+ x)  0, f(y + y)  0 and xi fi(x+ x) = 0 and yi fi(y + y) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n.
If xj = yj for some j = 1; ::; n then it must hold that
fj(x+ 
x)  fj(y + y):
Proof. If yj > 0 or if 
x = 0 then the results holds by construction.
If yj = 0 and 
x > 0 then we must have x + x  y + y. If this were not the case,
there must exist an i with xi > 0 and a  > 0 such that (xi + 
x
i ) = (yi + 
y
i ) and
(y + y) > (x+ x).
As in the previous proof this is a contradiction since fi ((y + y)) = fi(y + y)  0
while fi ((y + y)) < fi(x+ x) = 0. 
Proof of the Theorem. Dene the functions
V h0 (s; ) = u
0
h(s; )(C
h(s; )  eh(s)):
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For a given V hn , h 2 H dene n(s) = f 2 RH++ : V hn (s; )  0 for all h 2 Hg and
Ln : S  RH++ ! RH++ by
Ln(s; ) =
(
 if  2 n(s)
+  otherwise;
where
 2 f  0 : +  2 n(s); hV hn (+ ; s) = 0; 8hg: (43)
Note that Ln is only well dened whenever there exists a unique  that satises (43). By
Lemma 3 and the fact that  cannot be strictly positive, there exists at most one solution
whenever Vn satises the strict gross substitute property.
If this is the case, we can dene recursively
V hn (s; ) = u
0
h(s; )(C
1(s; )  e1(s)) + 
X
s0
(s; s0)V hn 1(s
0; Ln 1(s0; )): (44)
It is easy to see that V 0(s; :) satises the gross substitute property for all s, i.e. that
V h0 (s;  + ) < V
h
0 (s; ) for all  > 0 with h = 0. It follows from Lemma 4 that each Vn
then satises the strict gross substitute property.
It is a standard argument to show that equilibrium exist for each nitely truncated
economy and that therefore Ln(s; ) is always well dened.
The crucial step of the proof consist of showing, by induction, that Vn  Vn 1 for all n.
Clearly V h1 (s; :)  V h0 (s; :) for all h and all s. To prove that Vn+1(s; :)  Vn(s; :) whenever
Vn(s; :)  Vn 1(s; :) for all s, it su¢ ces to show that
Vn(s; Ln(s; ))  Vn 1(s; Ln 1(s; )) for all s and all  2 RH++: (45)
We can focus on the case where Ln(s; ) 6= Ln 1(s; ) and we can write Ln(s; ) = +  for
some   0 with i = 0 for some i. Note that if Vn(s; :)  Vn 1(s; :) then n 1(s)  n(s)
and therefore Ln 1(s; + ) > + . By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4 we
must have that Ln 1(s;  + ) = Ln 1(s; ): If x = Ln 1(s;  + ) 6= Ln 1(s; ) = y there
must be an i and a  with yi = xi and y > x. It is easy to verify that V in 1(s; x) = 0 and
by the gross substitute property this implies that V in 1(s; y) < 0 which is a contradiction.
Finally observe that for each h 2 H and each s 2 S the function V hn (s; :) are uniformly
bounded above and therefore converge pointwise as n!1 to some function V h (s; :). It is
straightforward to verify that this function describes a collateral constrained Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium. 
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